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ABSTRACT
Economic Effects of the Firefighters' Union
This is a study of the effects of unionism in the public sector
occupation of firefighting. A large and detailed set of data permits
the examination of submarkets of this occupation. A before/after
methodology is introduced to obtain more precise estimates of union
wage differentials. The study's findings are: (1) that there is a
greater union effect on fringes than on salaries which indicates a
significant alteration in the composition of the compensation package;
(2) that the estimates from the before/after methodology confirm the
cross—section results which show modest union wage differentials; and,
most significantly, (3) that the union effect varies along different
dimensions ——mostnotably the length of the contractual arrangement






(617) 868—3915The growth of public sector unionism in the last two decades raises
important questions about the economic effects of unions of governmental workers.
Do these unions have large or small impacts on wages or costs? Most recent
research, based on cross—sectional comparisons of wages and union status across
cities or selected decision units (see Lewin for a useful summary), have found
only small effects. In part because of data availability, little attention has
been given to the impact of public unions on fringe benefits and the structure
of wages, and little to differences in the impact of unions under different
market conditions. Although public sector unionism is a recent development,
no study has estimated union effects on a before—after basis.
This study seeks to remedy these gaps in our knowledge. It examines
the economic effects of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF)
using a large pooled cross—section sample of cities. It compares cities before
and after unionism as well as on a cross—section basis; it estimates the impact of
unionism on fringes and the structure of wages as well as total compensation,—
and on cities with different forms of municipal governments. The large sample
permits estimation of separate equations for union and nonunion cities which
cast light on the way unionism alters the wage—setting process.
Previous work on the IAFF has dealt with relatively small samples
(Ashenfelter, 130 cities; Ehrenbrugh, 256 cities) and been limited to cross—
section comparisons of wage effects. Ashenfelter found a modest union impact
on wages (the average cross—section result for 1961 to 1966 was .036) but con-
trolled only for cost of living differences across cities. Ehrenburgh made the
important innovation of using the presence of an IAFF contract as the union
variable and found a larger effect (.098). Neither study corrected for 'omitted'
city factors that might be associated with both unionism and the level of wages.2
This study finds moderate union compensation effects using cross—section
data on over 1,000 cities and comparisons of pay before and after unionism in
300 to 500 cities, and finds that most of the effect occurs via fringes rather
than straight—time pay. The similarity between before—after and cross—section
comparisons suggests no serious selectivity bias in the standard cross—section
union equations. The study also finds quite different union effects depending
on the length of time organized and on the type of cities, suggesting thatmarket and
organizational factors influence the economic impact of unionism
The paper is divided into four sections. Section I describes the insti-
tutional setting in which the IAFF and cities bargain over compensation. Section
II describes the data used in the analysis. Section III sets out the econometric
model. Section IV presents the basic empirical results and considers differential
effects of unionism among types of cities. The paper concludes with a brief
summary of findings.
I. The Firefighter's Market
Firefighting is the most extensively organized public employee occupation.
The IAFF has been organizing fire fighters since 1918, so many large fire depart-
ments were IAFF locals prior to the surge of public employee unionism in the
sixties. In 1960, approximately 74 percent of the nation's 137,884 firefighters
were organized. Through the sixties, the IAFF's ranks grew (from 1962 to 1964,
85 new locals and 2,044 members; from 1964 to 1966, 122 new locals and 7,000 mem-
bers); however, this growth did little more than keep pace with the growth of the
occupation itself. By 1972, there were 194,785 firefighters in the United States,
and approximately 77 percent organized.
As municipal employees, firefighters are paid out of a publicly financed
budget, not out of a firm's revenue like private employees. Revenue from pro-
perty taxes is usually the largest part of a municipal budget, supplemented by3
income and sales taxes. The property tax—based revenue is often divided between
more than one governing unit or district, all depending on the same base.
Because municipal government decisions depend on a politically formulated budget,
the collective bargaining process in firefighting is political in nature.Dis—
tiiictfrom actual negotiations, IAFF lobbying on issues of budget formulation and
budget allocations is a key process affecting firefighters' pay. Often the IAFF
finds itself competing with other municipal unions for a larger share of the
budget. (Although this inter—union competition is similar to craft union com-
petition in the construction industry, the occupational peculiarities of fire
fighting limit the usefulness of such an analogy.)
The second "tier" of the process, the actual negotiations, also has
distinctive political aspects. Government authority is generally not as cen-
tralized as that of a private institution. A bargaining representative may not
even have the authority to allocate funds for a settlement he may have reached.
A legislature may repudiate the settlement, or certain state funds may not be
forthcoming to ensure a settlement at the local level. Despite the problems
of repudiation, and the potentially lengthy delays involved in litigatioris,
rarely will a contract dispute result in a strike. Depending on state laws,
public employees and union officials may face stiff fines, jailing or even
dismissal for participating in a public—employee strike. Although the IAFF
eliminated a "no—strike" clause from its constitution at its 1968 convention,
harsh consequences do deter firefighter strikes. In 1972, there were only 11
work stoppages by firefighters in the United States. The average work stoppage
involved a department of 52 employees and lasted for only four days. To remedy
the costly problems of delays due to repudiation and litigation, 17 states have
adopted arbitration systems for public sector bargaining impasses. Five of
these states have adopted a "last best offer" arbitration system in which the
arbitrator chooses either the last position of union or of management on an4
issue—by—issue basis, or on a package basis. However, the results of the
arbitration process are often longer delays, and occasionally more court action.
IAFF contract negotiations in the town of Ipswich, Massachusetts
illustrate the problems involved in this second tier of public bargaining.
In Ipswich contract negotiation has involved an initial settlement, repudiation
of that settlement eight months later, failure of mediation and fact finding
by appropriate state agencies, a last best offer arbitration award in favor
of the IAFF local, court action which vacated the arbitration panel's award,
and an appeal by the local of the court decision. Finally, the town and the
firefighters agreed to a retroactive agreement in April 1978, but through the
first months of 1978 the Ipswich firefighters continued to work under their
1973 contract.
Overall, contrary to the claim of Wellington and Winter, industrial
relations in this public sector do not appear to create great union power
because of the essential nature of the services provided. The threat of repu-
diation and court delays makes it more difficult for the heads of the locals
to deliver a wage agreement to their ranks. The penalties accompanying strikes
severely limit the economic power of the union. Moreover, seniority compensation
(called longevity pay in the protective services) and pension benefits are often
non—portable from department to department, depending on state rulings. This
non portability of benefits is sometimes coupled with residency requirements.
In such a case, a firefighter cannot change departments without first changing
his residence and losing his longevity salary increments and his position in his
employer's pension system. This immobility within the firefighter occupation
works against the bargaining power of the IAFF, because firefighters are not
free to change jobs to look for better conditions. It would appear unreasonable
to expect enormous union wage effects.5
II. Data
This study has obtained data from a variety of sources on wages, fringes,
unionism, and diverse control variables to estimate the economics of the
-IAFF.Wage and fringe data are obtained from statistics on wage and salary
expenditures CS), number of full—time employees (E), and duty hours per week (H),
and city contribution (C) to employees' retirement benefits and to insurance
programs, in the Municipal Yearbook. The average hourly wage is measured by
W =(S/E)/52Hon the assumption that workers are employed year round. Fringes
paid per hour are defined as F =(C/E)/52Hwhile total compensation (TC) is the
sum F + W. The data on wages are available for two years: 1966, when relatively
few collective contracts were signed for firefighters, and for 1976. Fringe
data relate to 1976 only and thus cannot be analyzed in the before—after frame-
work. :1:
In addition to the average hourly wage or salary and fringes, the analy-
sis uses total salary (52HW) and entrance and maximum salaries (defined as "the
annual base salary of a firefighter during his first twelve months on the force,...
and the maximum annual base salary paid full—time firefighters not holding any
promotional rank"), as dependent variables likely to be affected by unionism.
If the IAFF influences hourly wages by changing hours worked rather than yearly
salary, the coefficient on the hourly and yearly wage equations will differ. If
the IAFF changes the wage structure or accelerates promotions, it is likely to
have different effects on entrance, maximum, and average salaries.
Unionism is measured by the presence of an IAFF contract and in some
calculations by the presence of an IAFF local. As Ehrenberg argues, the contract
variable provides a better measure of the potential effectiveness of the union
in altering wages and work conditions. Because of the lack of data on unioniza-
tion for some cities in 1966, the study employs three samples: (1) a sample of
1,015 cities for the 1976 cross—section when figures exist for all of the relevant6
cities; (2) a sample of 597 cities for the 1966—1976 analysis based on the
smaller number of cities in the Municipal Yearbook 1966, with cities having
"not reported or not applicable" union figures categorized as nonunion (a
reasonable surmise as those cities were not included in the 1964 IAFF Convention
Reports as sending delegates to the union convention); and (3) a smaller sample
of 307 cities in which the "not reported or not applicable" were deleted from
consideration.
The other "control" variables fall into two categories: those which
differ over time2 and those which do not change over time for each city (or
in which the change is assumed to be insignificant in the determination of wages).
Those variables which change over time include: population; opportunity
wage; alarms per 1,000 people; per capita income; median value of single family
housing; and per capita general revenue from city's own sources. Population is
expected to be positively related to the demand for fire services, while oppor-
tunity wage3 should be negatively related to the supply of firefighters. The
fire insurance rating could signal a compensating differential for work in more
hazardous communities; number of alarms, as a proxy for number of runs by a
department, is expected to be positively related to wage. Per capita income,
median housing value, and per capita revenue should yield positive coefficients
in wage equations as well. --
Thosevariables in which the change is assumed to be insignificant
in the determination of wages are: percent of population that is non—white;
four region controls; government type (council—manager, canmission plan, mayor—
council,, town meeting); and land area. With population controlled land area
may be positively related to wages (fire department responsible for more ter-
ritory) or negatively related to wages (fire department responsible for a more
densely populated area, in which firefighting may be morehazardous).47
III.Econometric Models
Two types of econometric models will be used to estimate the effect of
the IAFF on pay. As in previous studies of union wage effects,, a cross—section
model of the following form will be estimated first:
(1) mW1 =a1
+ ct1U1 + +
where =wageor compensation
U1 =0—1variable for whether or not city has a collective contract for
period 1
list of controls for period 1
=residual,assumed N(0, a2)
To the extent that the X's control for factors which are correlated with mW
and unionism, so that E(E1U) =0,equation (1) will yield an unbiased estimate
of the union effect.
Iti reasonable to expectthatthe union effect will differ along
rious dimensions. Informationon organization in a prior (base year)
period permits the model (1)tobe extended to allow the lengthof organization
to influence the union effect. Let IJ =0—1dummy variable for having a contract
in the base year and in the current period; U =0—1dummy variable for having
a contract in the base year only; and U10—1 dummy variable f or a contract in
the current period. Then we can expand (1) as follows:
(2) mW1 =a+ + a2(U01) + c3(U0) + X1 + Ej
Ifbeing organized overtwoperiods has a greater impact on wages than organiza-
tion over a shorter span, the coefficient on U01(c2) will exceed that on
If a city that signs a contract in an early period but not in a later period
maintains union wage scales,. the coefficient on U0(c3)willbe positive. If
neither of these factors operate, (2) will collapse in the model (1).8
If the X's do not completely control for wage—determining factors that
are correlated with unionism, (1) and (2) will not yield the desired impact
parameters. Assume, for example, that there is an omitted city effect (D) that
is positively correlated with unionism and with wages: in this case the OLS
estimate of (1) would yield an upwardly biased estimate of the truec. Alter-
natively, if the omitted effect were positively correlated with Uand negatively
with wages, the OLS estimate would be downward biased.
To handle this problem, we make further use of data on an earlier cross—
section, in which the omitted factor is also expected to operate. Formally,
assume that in (1) =D+ where E(DU1)QandE(Z1U1) =0.Assume also
_thatDalsoaffects wages in the other period:
(3) lnW =a0+ c0U0 +t++
whereis a scaling factor that permits city effects tovary over time and
where E(50i1) =E(J.0) E(50U) =0.In this base year equation, there is no
specification of detailed union variables, as theU0 period is chosen early
enough so that interaction variables with even earlier periods have littlemeaning.
Substituting for D in (1) we obtain:
(4) mW = AmW0 + (am—Aa&+
— +a1U1 —
Ao0U0+
If X=l and U0 =0,(4) becomes a straightforward before—after comparison:
(5) mW1 —mW0
=a+ ll —OO+ lUl OUQ +
where E((—)U )= 0.
When 1, however, equation (4) must be estimated
An estimate of A can be obtained by regressing mW1 on inW0 and the other
right—hand side variables of (4). However, because
E(W0)
0, the estimate9
of ). will be biased downward, causing an upward bias in the union coefficient
if, conditional on all other variables, W1 is positively correlated with W0.
To estimate the magnitude of the bias, let b ' bethe regression
WcIJi .X
coefficient linking the wage in the base period to unionism in period 1, con-
ditional on all other variables; let . bethe corresponding partial
dl
correlation coefficient and P (O<P<l) be the ratio of the variance of to the
variance of mW0. Then the bias on the union coefficient c due to the failure to
obtain the appropriate value of A is determined by (see Griliches Ringstad, p. 197):
(6) plimcIU01Pc+o
WoTjl.
while the bias in estimatingAis
plim A= l—P/(l—r n÷
Empirically, the values of the relevant regression and correlation coefficients
suggest that the bias on the union term is slight.
More complex equations, which include union interaction terms as in (6)
can also be developed, with comparable results. The key point is that by addition
of the base year wages to the equation, one obtains at least some control on the
charges that results are due to unobserved city factors.
The empirical work focuses on two dependent variables, wages paid firemen
and fringe benefits. For several reasons the union effect is likely to be greater
on fringes than on straight—time pay. First, in setting their bargaining goals
unions are likely to give greater weight to the preferences of the more senior
employees who favor fringes and less to young marginal employees than would occur
in a competitive market (see Freeman for detailed discussion). Second, because
of the timing of elections, and the short—term horizon of politicians, local10
governments are likely to be more willing to pay fringes whose costs will
accrue more greatly in the future than in the present.
When straight—time pay is the dependent variable, (1) or (4) or (5)
can be estimated directly. When fringes are the dependent variable, it is
also necessary to control for the overall level of pay, due to the likely
positive income elasticity of fringes. Simply adding total compensation to
the list of independent variables would not be correct, for fringes are in-
cluded in total compensation. To deal with this problem, let us write the
model with variables in linear form:
(7) F + 13t + 32(TC) + YU + E
= o+ + 2(F+S) + yu + c
where F =dollarsof fringes
TC =dollarsof total compensation
S =dollarsof straight—time pay
Solving for F by separating F out of TC,
(8) F = + (/i)S +/i)u +s/1
The true union effect, y, is isolated by first solving for Let 2 represent
the coefficient on S obtained in (S). The product of the coefficient on unionism
in (8) and 12 (which equals l/l+2) then yields the desired parameter y of
equation (7).
Besides the union effect on straight—time pay and fringes, unionism
may also affect the structure of wages in the city, as has been found to be
the case of the teachers' union (Gustman and Segal). We will examire the
effects of the IAFF on maximum pay, entrance salary, and hours worked.
Finally, to evaluate the possibility that unionism influences the
entire process of wage—setting and/or has different effects on different types
of governmental bodies, separate union and nonunion wage equations will be11
estimated. With separate equations, union effects will show up in different
weights placed on different factors. Average effects can be calculated by
using the regression weights to standardize the wages. For example, if 6.
isthe coefficient on X. in the nonunion equation, and X is the mean of the
1 U
variable for unionists, the overall union wage effect would be the difference
between what unionists got (W) and what they would have obtained if they were
nonunion:
(9) w— u n u
Conversely, using the union equation to provide weights, the union effect could
be estimated as:
(10) W —Y n u n
where W1 =wageof nonunionists.
IV.BasicEmpirical Results
Table 1 presents estimates of the effect of an IAFF local and, more
importantly, a signed contract on several measures of the wages and work con-
ditions of firemen for 1976 and 1966. The table presents calculations for
several samples, defined by the selection criteria described earlier. In
column 1 unionism is measured by the presence of an IAFF local; in columns 2—6
by a signed contract. Columns 1 and 2 show, consistent with the Ehrenberg
argument, that the presence of a contract is the key to a trade union effect,
with the measures of pay in the largest sample unaffected by the IAFF local
se but positively influenced by the presence of the contract. The remaining
columns focus on the contract variable. For 1976, the table reveals a modest,
but significant, union effect on total compensation, a smaller effect on hourly
and annual salary, little impact on hours worked, and a small effect on the maxi-
mum and entrance scales. In 1966, by contrast, the union effects are much less1976 controls:
1966 controls:
Table 1
Cross—Section Estimates of IAFF Earnings Differentials,
12
1966 and 1976*





























































(.008) (.009) (.011) (.014) (.013) (.014)
land area, percent nonwhite, per capita city revenue, population,
alternate salary, fire rating, alarms per 1000 people, per capita
income, median value of housing, government type, region.
land area, percent nonwhite, per capita city revenue, population,
alternate salary, fire rating, alarms per 1000 people, median
value of housing, government type, region.
*Standard errors are in parentheses.13
and do not differ significantly from zero. In both years the results differ
only slightly by sample size.
The markedly greater effect of unionism on total compensation than on
salaries in the 1976 cross—section imply a sizeable effect on fringes, since
fringes make up 14.6 percent of total compensation. Table 2 shows the impor-
tance of introducing a more detailed union break, as in equation (2). Using
three contract variables (contract in both periods, U76,
66'contract in 1976
only, U76; and contract in 1966 only, U665) reveals a clear and striking pattern.
With the exceptions of the hours variable (in which there are no significant
differences among the three coefficients) and of the maximum salary variable
with r=597 (in which the contractin—l976—only coefficient is insignificantly
greater than the contract in both periods coefficient), it is always the case
that the U66,76 coefficient is largest and the U66 coefficient smallest.
Furthermore, the p66, 76 coefficients in the non—salary scale equations are
nearly twice the coefficients on simple contract variables in the corresponding
"equation 1" —typecross—sections, indicating that the union effect varies
significantly with length of time organized.
Fringes
Table 3 examines the union effect on fringes by regressing $1/year in
fringes on unionism and the control variables used in Table 1 and by estimating
logistic probability equations that relate the probability of having city—funded
fringes to unionism.The results are clear. Total fringe spending is raised
by $170.38 or 9.4 percent of fringes by presence of an IAFF contract (column 1,
line ).
Morespecifically, the effect of unions on fringe spending
can be of two typesunions can raise the likelihood that a city
offers a given fringe or it can raise spendingTable 2: 1976 Cross—Section with Detailed Contract Variables
n307 n597
Contractin ContractContractContractContractContract
1976andin in 1976in 1966in 1976 in 1976in1966








1. Total .082 .026 —.061 .073 .022 —.071
Compensation (.034) (.023) (.031) (.033) (.018) (.030)
2. Wage (sal/hr) .079 .036 .009 .046 .026 —.009
(.031) (.021) (.028) (.033) (.018) (.030)
3. Salary .052 .021 —.020 .029 .016 —.036
(.028) (.019) (.025) (.029) (.016) (.026)
4. Hours —.027 —.014 —.029 —.018 —.011 —.027
(.015) (.010) (.013) (.016) (.009) (.014)
5. Maximum .027 .022 —.005 .017 .026 —.015
Salary (.022) (.016) (.020) (£21) (.011) (.018)
6. Entrance .035 .025 —.007 .031 .028 —.005
Salary (.024) (.016) (.021) (.021) (.011) (.019)
Other controls: Same as 1976 controls, Table 1.
14Table 3: IAFF Effect on Fringe Benefits,
by Type of Fringe, for 1976
(n =1098)
All Fringes Retirement Insurance
1. Mean 1812.50 1415.50 397.0
(in $/year) (l47i.00) (1330.20) (350.0)
2. Union Effect 152.25 80.68 72.65
(in $) (94.25) (87.76) (23.42)
3. Union Effect 148.63 76.44 72.25
(in $)with (88.81) (82.10) (23.42)
salary controlled
4. Union Effect, .082 .054 .182
salary controlled
as % of mean
(line 3/line 1)









7. Logit coeffi— .917 .461 .703
cient for (.309) (.222) (.225)
likelihood
of program
8. Union Effect .057 .049 .079
on likelihood
of program
*Stijdard deviations/standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Other controls are according to "1976 controls" from Table 1.
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on that fringe. To examine the former possibility a logit curve [P =1/1+exp
— wasestimated linking the probability of having specified fringes to
a contract and other variables. As can be seen in lines 7 and 8, according to
the logistic equations, unionism raises the probability of having those benefits
of .05 and .08 points respectively at the mean levels.
The union effect on the spending on fringes is examined in lines (1)
through (5). Line (3) shows the union coefficient taken from the equation (8)
model of Section III. Then correcting these coefficients according to the
analysis of that section yields the line (5) coefficients. The union effect on
both fringes taken together is 9.4 percent; on retirement fringes (which comprise
78.1 percent of this fringe package), it is 6.1 percent; and on the insurance
benefits (with a mean of $397 for all cities), 18.4 percent. As the results in
Table 1 imply, the union effect on fringes is significantly greater than on
salaries and wages.
IAFF representatives offer interesting explanations for the greater
union impact on fringes. A Los Angeles representative cites the importance
of the JAFF's central research department in "informing the locals' represen-
tatives of the successes of various experiments in the arrangement of fringe
packages." He also feels that city negotiators are sympathetic to the argument
that the government has a "social responsibility" to keep fringe benefits up to
levels offered to employees in the private sector. Finally, he says that the
costs of fringes "do not impact immediately." A bargaining representative and
trustee for the Yonkers fire fighters also feels that city negotiators do not
realize the full impact of fringe costs. This is especially true if an admini—
stration is going out of office. He has found that bargaining with a lame—duck
administration, when there is going to be a change in party control, allows the
union local to make significant gains in fringes. He says the administration
of one party will sometimes make it more difficult on the rival party's admini-
stration by putting a greater strain on following years' budgets, while winning
support of a special interest group ——thefirefighters.17
Before/after analysis
To what extent might the preceding results be in error because of the
possible correlation between unionism (other independent variables) and omitted
city factors? Does before/after contract analysis yield similar or different
estimated union effects?
As a first step toward getting a handle on this question, it is useful
to find Out which cities are being unionized. From 1966 to 1976, approximately
19 percent of the sample of 597 became organized. Logistic curve estimates of
the impact of wages on the probability of organization yielded only a slight
tendency for organization to be affected by initial wages (a logit coefficient
of .55 with asymptotic standard error of .80). Since the correlation between
unionization and salary or wages is not clear cut, the implication is that the
omitted city factor is not an important determinant of wages and salaries that
is correlated with unionism.
Part I of Table 4 presents explicit estimates of the contract effect on
average yearly and hourly salaries and on the maximum and entrance salaries given
a A of 1. It regresses the change in salaries on the presence or absence of
contracts in 1976 and 1966 broken into the three discrete categories used earlier:
contracts in both years (U6 66);-no.cont-ractin the initial year, contract in
1976 (U76); and contract in 1966-, none in 1976 (U66); with a, deleted group of
no contracts in both periods.
If unionism had the same effect on pay in both years there would be no
effect on the U66,
76variable while those on U andU66 would have equal oppo-
site signs. If unionism had larger effects in 1976 than 1966, as indicated in
the cross—section regressions, the U6676 dummy would obtain a positive coeff i—
cient which would be smaller than that on U76 while theU66 group would have
negative coefficients of equal magnitude. As is evident in the tables, neither
of these possibilities turns out to be the case. While the U661is
Table4: Estimates of the Impact of Unionism
Obtained from "Before/After" Methodology*
Dependent Hourly Wage Average Salary Entrance Maximum Salary
Variable: Salary Scale Scale
n307
U76,66 .037 (.034) .053 (.027) .035 (.022) .032 (.021)
U76 .013 (.024) .017 (.018) .026 (.015) .017 (.014)
U66 .021 (.030) .008 (.023) .007 (.020) .005 (.018)
A 1 1 1 1
U= 597
—.005 (.037) .033 (.031) .039 (.020) .036 (.020)
U76 —.020 (.021) .006 (.017) .026 (.011) .022 (.010)
U66 —.019 (.033) —.011 (.027) —.003 (.018) .005 (.016)
A 1 1 1 1
II n307
U76,66 .061 (.029) .053 (.025) .030 (.020) .036 (.020)
U76 .026 (.020) .020 (.017) .017 (.014) .025 (.015)
U66 .016 (.025) —.002 (.022) .011 (.018) —.008 (.009)
.436 (.050) .628 (.067) .684 (.065) .630 (.066)
=597
U7666 .026 (.030) .032 (.027) .030 (.018) .038 (.018)
U76 .007 (.016) .011 (.015) .022 (.010) .026 (.011)
U66 —.012 (.027) —.022 (.024) —.003 (.016) —.004 (.009)
x .399(.034) .465 (.043) .604 (.042) .574 (.041)
*Standard errors are in parentheses.19
variable obtains negative coefficients in many cases not dissimilar in magnitudeto
those for the- u g-roup, the biggest effects are on cities with contracts in both
years. The striking pattern revealed in Table 2 remains, even with base year
wages or salaries controlled.
Part II of Table 4 presents the contract coefficients for the case of a
variable A. Although A's range from .40 to .6-8 in the OLS estimators for the four
dependent variables examined, the union coefficients are nearly identical in three
cases with those from the Al estimators. In the fourth case, with hourly wage
as the dependent variable, the tJ7666 group-'showsan even greater advantage
the-other groups than in the- A=1case. --As presented in Section 1111, -
however,there is a bias in the variable A which needs to be estimated.
Regressing mW66 on the three contract dummies and the other control
variables yields rW U.Xs which range from .0003 to .089. Thus for all of the
66
three contract coefficients for any wage or salary dependent variable, R u.
66 -
boundsat .008, or effectively zero. Allowing P from section III to be .50 as
an upper bound, we see that(Table 4, part II) will underestimate A by a factor
of 2 at most. Twice the calculated A's will yield estimates of the union effect
with frxedEJ, the case already examined. Since A's
will range between the calculated A's and X=l, and since the contract coefficients
vary only slightly between when these upper and lower bounds for A are used, we
conclude that the biases in the contract coefficients as presented in Table 4,
part II are also slight. A comparison of the coefficients 1n-Tbi4 ith-h-Q-
inTable 2 shows that the estimates of the coefficients on unionisn are only
slightly affected by different allowances for the omitted factor. Although in
the hourly wage regressions there is some decrease in the union coefficients
with the addition of a control for base period wages, union coefficients in the
salary regressions are virtually unaffected by the addition of such a control.
The most novel result in the calculations thus far is the much greater
impact of unionism when contracts are signed in 1966 and 1976 than in the other20
cases.What explains this result? The most likely explanation is that the
trade union effect differs notably by period of time and/or by type of city,
with either those organized earlier being more prone to union influence or for
the union effect to increase with time organized. More broadly, the results
suggest that there is no single union compensation effect, but rather that ef-
fects differ depending on the environment in which the union and city find them-
selves. In the remainder of this study we examine the interrelation between
union wages and 'environmental' factors in greater detail.
The nature of the union effect
One way of examining the interrelation between unionism and environmental
factors is to estimate separate wage functions for contract and noncontract cities
and to compare the resulting coefficients on variables. When the effect of a
variable is larger in the contract sample, this means that it is conducive to a
greater union wage effect and conversely when it is lower in the union sector.
Table 5 compares coefficients on selected variables in 1966 and 1976.
It shows clearly that the earnings functions of the union and nonunion cities
are quite different. However, from one time period to the next, patterns of coef-
ficients of the contract and noncontract are not consistent The most consistent pattern from
sample to sample, from one wage statistic to another, is that the per capita city
revenue. c-oefficients for the contract sub samples are greater than those in the noncontrac
subsamples. According to the estimates in column 3 for acontract and.änoncontract city
starting from a given wage level, a unionized city will tend to increase its
fire fighters' wages more for a given increment in per capita city revenue, pos-
sibly because the increased revenue results from political pressures by the
firefighters. Other noticeable differences in the coefficients include those
in median value of housing variable, which tend to be significantly greater for the
noncontractsample, andin per capita income, which also are generally greater in
dnnoneoct
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Table 5: Comparison of Selected Coefficients from
Contract and NonContract Earnings Functions for 1966 and 1976
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1966 1976
Independent City Median Value City Median Vaiu Per Capita
Variables: Revenue of Housing Revenue of Housing Income
K NK K NK K NK K NK K NK
Dependent
Variables:
Total —— —— —— .094.026.151.125 —.033.113
Compensation (.027) (.022) (.067) (.077) (.097)(.093)
Salary .053 .056 .119 .161 .075 .020 .160.166 —.023.082
(029) (.016) (.053) (.030) (.024) (.021) (.060) (.075) (.086) (.089)
Hourly Wage .044 .087 .137 .201 .100 .034 .134 .175.034.075
(.048) (.022) (.086) (.041) (.026) (.025) (.067) (.086) (.094) (.104)
Maximum .079 .063 .121 .172 .044 .014 .098 .119.061.113
Salary (.024) (.011) (.044) (.021) (.018) (.010) (.045) (.037) (.063) (.045)
Entrance .073 .035 .016 .123.053 —.0004 .106.097 —.069.076
Salary (.028) (.012) (.050) (.022) (.020) (.010) (.051) (.035) (.071) (.042)
Retirement 445.80 83.87 375.85 —358.153.02578.53
Experience 202. 34)(88.65)(5Ll. 44)(3l0. 8 (720.53)(373.79
(in$)
Insurance 34.54 11.94 —126.60 41.79 —74 .90 29.6l
Experience (44.71)(29.97)(ll3.0l)(105.09)(159.21)(126.36
(in $) ______________________________
Contract Samples Non—Contract Samples
1966: n =76 n =523
1976: n =287 n =728
Mean Retirement $1745.70 $1302.70
Expenditures:
Mean Insurance $489.23 $370.75
Expenditures:22
Next, the separate earnings equations can be used to estimate the contract
effect, by examining what contract (noncontract) wages would be if members were
paid according to the other equations, as indicated in (9) and (lO).of section III.
These estimates presented in Table 6 reinforce the earlier results revealing mode—
rate union effects on total compensation and straight—time pay and large effects
on fringes in 1976 (5.2 percent to 8.4 percent on retirement benefits; 14.7 percent
to 16.1 percent on insurance benefits). The 1966 contract effects are near zero
and usually negative.
Finally, are there any differences in union effects depending on the
governmental structure of cities? Are mayor—council cities more influenced by
unionism, because of less continuity of the political decision makers?
To examine this possibility, separate regressions were run for the two
major government types, mayor—council (MC, n=356) and council—manager (CM, n=657)
selected from the entire population of cities for 1976. No signif icant differences exist
by government type: contract coefficients in salary regressions were 3.9 percent
and 4.1 percent for MC and CM cities respectively, as compared to 3.1 percent
for the entire n=10l5 sample. Also consistent with results for the entire sample
are the MC and CM contract coefficients in the total compensation equations ——
bothabout 1 percent larger than their corresponding salary coefficients. These
slightly larger compensation coefficients again signal greater impact in the area
of fringes. MC and CM contract coefficients (with the level of compensation con-
trolled) for all fringes are 8.5 percent and 7.4 percent, consistent with the 9.4
percent for the total 1976 sample. However, contract coefficients for these two
government subsamples are slightly less than the coefficient for the entire sam-
ple in retirement benefit regressions (MC —4.6%;CM —4.2%;all —6.1%),and
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This study investigated the International Association of FireFighters
as a case study of public sector unions. With a larger number ofobservations,
and a larger set of variables, cross—section results showa small effect (local
or contract) on salaries in both 1966 and 1976: from —1.6percent to 3.4 percent
and larger effects in fringes and total compensation. The IAFF'seffect on
fringes is as much as four times its impact on salaries. The IAFF hasan es-
pecially significant impact on insurance benefits, with as much as an 18.3percent
contract effect. Furthermore, with compensation controlled, thestudy illustrates
how the IAFF significantly alters the composition of the totalcompensation pack-
age itself.
This paper also introduced a superior before/aftermethodology to the
study of union differentials in wages and salaries. For the firefighters, the
before/after model confirms the cross—section results.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, we have found significant dif-
ferences in union effects depending on economic environments,notably the length
of the contractual arrangement, and other factors, whichsuggest the need for
more detailed study of the diversity of union effects in the publicsector.FOOTNOTE S
25
1
Since the various wage statistics are derived from city expenditures, the
figures may not be accurate measures of firefighters' compensation in unionized
cities. If negotiations (and possible mediation, fact finding, repudiation,
and court action) are not completed by the end of a fiscal year, these statistics
will understate the eventual city expenditures for that year. Also, depending
on methods of reporting, retroactive settlements will cause such expenditure
statistics to overstate the true compensations in union cities for a given
fiscal year.
2There are missing values for some independent variables, especially
for smaller cities. So as not to lose cities from the samples, missing values
are estimated in a step—wise fashion based on the method described by Griliches,
---.-- Halland Ilauseman in "Missing Data and Self—Selection in Large Panels." While
not perfect, these estimates are reasonable approximations for the natural loga-
rithm of the given characteristic with the available information. Those charac-
teristics missing for only a few observations, ,areregressed on those inde—
ml
pendent variables which are present for the entire population, nm
Ya+B (Y ) 1nm
Once the few missing values are estimated, a second set of characteristics (which
are missing for a slightly larger group of cities, m2' are regressed on the now
larger set of non—missing information.
Y=b+B (Y )+B(y ) m2 2 nm 3nil
In a four—step process, all missing values are estimated with a least squares
equation.26
3The occupation classification "craftsmenand kindred workers," is
used for the opportunity wage variable because, out of those general classi-
fications available in the Census of Population for urban places of 10,000
or more, the "craftsmen" class had, on a national level, a composition by
race and sec closest to that of the firefighter occupation. The composition
by race and sex was the only check of the classification readily available.
In dollar terms, in 1976, the average salary of a firefighter was approximately
$10,845; the average of the median earnings of craftsmen was $8,113. In 1966,
the figures were $5,896 for firefighters, and $5,238 for craftsmen.
4Control Variable Data are taken from: TheMunicipal Yearbook 1966/
1976; Census of Population, vol. 1 1960/1970; County and City Data Book, 1967/
1972; Fire Record of Cities, 1960/1970, as published by National Fire Protection
Association.
5There are 84 cities in the "union 1966—nonunion1976" category in
the n307 and n=597 samples. The size of this group raises doubts about the
consistency of the union data for 1966 and 1976. However, the size of the
group is not improbable. IAFF convention reports show that 35 U.s. locals
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